


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NSA review completed



Seventh Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from
30 March through 5 April 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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6 April 1973

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25X1



SPECIAL NOTE

Tentative evidence received from communications intelligence too late for inclusion in the body of this report has identified a new NVA combat infiltration group in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam, about 35 miles north of the DMZ. [redacted]

[redacted] this group, with 120 personnel, was being re-routed and sent northward. The identifying number of the group indicates that it was originally scheduled to go to the northern part of South Vietnam. Further analysis will be required to determine the significance of the detection of this new group and its apparent northward movement.

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6 April 1973

Seventh Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
30 March through 5 April 1973)

The Key Points

- We have detected no new North Vietnamese infiltrators--not even small groups of specialists--starting the trip south during the past week.
- North Vietnamese military supplies continued to move through southern Laos toward and into South Vietnam, and the volume of supplies entering Laos at the top of the Ho Chi Minh trail system was somewhat above last week's level.
- Extremely heavy North Vietnamese logistic activity continued throughout the week in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam.
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists remained at a moderate level in South Vietnam and at a low level in Laos.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

The Details

NOTE: This is the seventh in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

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A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. We have no evidence that any new infiltration groups--not even any special purpose groups--started the trip south from North Vietnam during the past week. Farther down in the infiltration pipeline--in southern Laos--we did detect for the first time a few additional small groups of specialists who had left North Vietnam sometime in February or March. Because these groups are small, our estimates of total infiltration since the ceasefire remain unchanged. (The estimated total of North Vietnamese personnel is 35,000, of whom some 25,000 were in the pipeline as of 28 January and some 10,000 began the journey south thereafter.)

2. Since most of these 35,000 personnel have now reached their destinations in South Vietnam or adjacent border areas, the infiltration of combat troops during the current dry season may now be coming to an end. The Central Intelligence Agency believes that there are probably less than 5,000 infiltrators still remaining in the pipeline, and most of them are civilian and military specialists and stragglers from previously reported regular infiltration groups. The Department of Defense believes

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that the majority of infiltration groups in the pipeline since the ceasefire have reached their destination by now, but that approximately 10,000 are still in the system. Both agencies agree, however, that unless new infiltration groups start the journey south in the coming days, the infiltration system will be cleared of combat replacement troops within several weeks.

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3. During the past week an additional North Vietnamese SA-2 site was established near Khe Sanh. There are now a total of nine SA-2 sites in the Khe Sanh area which have been constructed since the beginning of this year. At least two of these were occupied [redacted] Two other sites were known to be occupied [redacted] but we have no more recent evidence on their status. In addition to the SA-2 sites, a cluster of four antiaircraft artillery sites, two of which are radar-controlled 57-mm batteries, have been identified some ten miles east of Khe Sanh. Identification of radar-controlled AAA batteries in South Vietnam is rare and suggests a qualitative increase in Communist antiaircraft defense capabilities in this area.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos


4. North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos and South Vietnam continued during the week at the same high levels detected throughout March. Heavy vehicle activity was observed over the length of the Laos Panhandle, the greatest traffic volumes occurring west of the A Shau Valley

and in the tri-border area. From these locations, NVA logistic units shipped large quantities of military supplies toward the central and southern parts of South Vietnam. Within South Vietnam itself, NVA logistic units also continued to move large quantities of materiel into and out of supply bases in Quang Tri Province. The major logistic buildup of the Communists in this area equals or exceeds the buildup which was observed just before and during the North Vietnamese offensive of 1972.

5. On the entry corridors from North Vietnam into the Laos Panhandle, truck traffic moving southward through the passes increased slightly over the previous week's level. Within southern North Vietnam itself, we received little new evidence during the week of southbound logistic movements, but our coverage in this area is weak. At the same time, we did continue to detect substantial supply shipments from North Vietnam to northern Laos.

6. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the reporting period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

- (a) On 30 March, 26 vehicles reportedly delivered 93 tons of TNT, rocket and mortar ammunition to a logistic entity in northern Quang Tri Province. After the receipt of this



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[redacted]

cargo, the unit was observed to have over 900 tons of ammunition and construction-related explosive material in storage.

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- (b) [redacted] 137 cargo trucks were observed along Route 9 in western Quang Tri Province. Some were headed east; some were headed west.
- (c) In the Khe Sanh area, 23 cargo vehicles were observed halted on Route 608 (north of Khe Sanh) and 30 cargo vehicles dispersed along Route 616 (to the south) [redacted]

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- (d) [redacted] 18 cargo trucks were observed moving west on Route 9 in the Khe Sanh area. There were also 65 North Vietnamese cargo vehicles--35 of them parked--on Route 608 north of Khe Sanh on the same day.
- (e) [redacted] 27 southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1033 in the western DMZ, and a total of 98 cargo vehicles moved south over this route during the period 30 March through 5 April. Also in this area, 14 northbound cargo trucks were seen on Route 1032B on 3 April.

- (f) [redacted] the North Vietnamese are making contingency plans to move some supplies across the border from Laos into Quang Tri Province camouflaged as civilian traffic, if and when planned ICCS checkpoints in that area become operational.

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7. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in north and south Laos and northeastern Cambodia

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were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of the activity in the Laos Panhandle and Cambodia probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

- (a) On 29 March, a North Vietnamese logistic unit active in the Nam Ou River area of Luang Prabang Province received over 400 rounds of rocket and mortar ammunition, plus significant quantities of mines, grenades and other associated hardware.
- (b) From 29 March through 1 April, at least 370 vehicles were observed moving between two Communist logistic units in the southern Laos Panhandle. About 200 of these vehicles were headed for a destination in northeastern Cambodia adjacent to Pleiku Province, South Vietnam.
- (c) One NVA logistic unit active in the area northwest of Ban Bac moved 690 cargo-loaded vehicles into the A Shau Valley region during March, according to reliable evidence.
- (d) On 29 March, a North Vietnamese logistic unit operating in the Tchepone area received 42 cargo vehicles and dispatched 71.

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 (e) [redacted] ten NVA cargo trucks were observed halted on Route 23 south of Mu Gia Pass.

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 (f) [redacted] 26 southbound cargo trucks were observed on Route 912 southwest of the Ban Karai Pass.

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 [redacted] 258 northbound and 259 southbound trucks were observed transiting the Pass.

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(g) [redacted] heavy truck movement was observed on routes 99 and 920 in the central Laos Panhandle. In all, over 200 NVA trucks were seen, of which more than half were loaded and heading south. This is the highest level of activity observed in this area since 12 March.

8. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies which are probably destined for South Vietnam and northern Laos.

(a) [redacted] a storage facility near Vinh was observed dispatching toward northern Laos 11 tons of cargo, including 8 tons of explosives.

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(b) [redacted] 53 tons of supplies-- including six tons of ammunition-- were shipped from Vinh over Route 7 toward northern Laos.

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(c) The major NVA POL transshipment facility located in Thanh Hoa Province pumped nearly 7,000 tons of POL during March, according to reliable information. Past experience would indicate that nearly all of this amount was being moved southward.

C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces
In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (30 March - 5 April) are shown below:

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Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire		Last Week (30 Mar-5 Apr)	
	Level of Action		Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	686	2,455	33	107
MR 2	172	1,038	7	116
MR 3	225	1,489	28	93
MR 4	336	3,123	34	281
Totals	1,419	8,105	102 (118) <u>1/</u>	597 (527) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

11. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

MILITARY REGION 1

- (a) On 2 April, west and southwest of Hue a total of 270 82-mm mortar rounds were directed against ARVN infantry units.

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
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


Red lineTotal violations

Black line ..Major violations


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
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- (b) On 2 April, elements of the 1st ARVN Division west and southwest of Hue, received a total of 396 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (c) On 4 April, 10 miles west of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy ABF of 785 rounds of mixed ordnance.

MILITARY REGION 2

- (a) On 31 March, 15 miles southwest of Pleiku, an element of an ARVN ranger battalion was hit by an ABF of 500 mixed 60-mm/82-mm mortar rounds.

MILITARY REGION 3

- (a) On 29 and 30 March, enemy elements fired a total of 519 rounds of mixed ordnance during four attacks by fire into the Tonle Cham Base Camp eight miles southwest of An Loc.
- (b) On 30 March, enemy forces attacked an element of an ARVN infantry battalion 16 miles southwest of Lao Khe.
- (c) On 30 and 31 March, Tonle Cham Base Camp received 256 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (d) On 1 April, Tonle Cham Base Camp received an ABF of 275 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (e) On 2 and 3 April, the Tonle Cham Base Camp received 495 artillery and mortar rounds.
- (f) On 3 and 4 April, the Tonle Cham Base Camp received 231 rounds of mixed ordnance.

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- (g) On 4 April, four miles west-southwest of Song Be, elements of an ARVN ranger border defense battalion received an enemy ground attack.
- (h) On 4 April, five miles southeast of Tay Ninh City, elements of an RF battalion received an enemy ABF of 100 mortar rounds followed by a ground assault.

MILITARY REGION 4

- (a) On 3 April, 18 miles northeast of Chau Doc, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN armored cavalry squadron and an infantry battalion.
- (b) On 4 April, 10 miles northeast of Vinh Long, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy ground attack.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces In Laos During the Week From 30 March through 5 April

12. During the week, significant Communist-initiated incidents were recorded in the Ban Houei Sai area of Laos Military Region I, southeast of the Plain of Jars in MR-II, and in the area between Khong Sedone and Saravane in MR-IV. Minor skirmishing continued near several contested villages south of Thakhek in MR-III.

13. Activity in all other areas of Laos remained at a low level, although there have been recent indications of Communist preparations to launch major attacks against Government forces southeast of the Plain and at the Sala Phou Khoun road junction in MR-II. There is strong evidence that elements of a North Vietnamese Army regiment have moved southeastward

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from the Plain and are preparing to attack Government forces which thus far have thwarted Communist efforts to reopen Route 4 south of Xieng Khouangville. There is also evidence that local Pathet Lao and Dissident Neutralist forces intend to attack the Route 7/13 intersection at Sala Phou Khoun in the near future, although their ability to capture and hold this road junction is questionable.

14. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred between 30 March and 5 April and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:

- (a) On 30 March, North Vietnamese Army forces conducted an attack-by-fire and a two-company ground attack against a Royal Lao Army (FAR) position near the former Royal Lao Government irregular base at Pha Dong, southeast of the Plain of Jars. The FAR defenders were forced to withdraw from the position.
- (b) On 31 March, there was a low level of military activity throughout Laos.
- (c) On 1 April, there was no significant activity countrywide.
- (d) On 2 April, again there was no significant activity throughout Laos.
- (e) On 3 April, the position of a RLG battalion northeast of Khong Sedone in MR-IV was attacked by an estimated Communist battalion supported by approximately 350 rounds of mortar fire. The RLG force deployed in this sector also received about 160 rounds of mortar fire in its regimental command post area. Despite the reported intensity of this action,

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[Redacted]

casualties were light and RLG forces apparently lost no positions. A series of Communist ground and mortar attacks against a RLG battalion located north of Ban Houei Sai in MR-I forced the friendly unit to withdraw 20 kilometers westward to the Mekong River, and possibly across it into Burma.

- (f) On 4 April, only light contact was reported throughout Laos.
- (g) On 5 April, again only light activity was reported.



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